The New Collection
Seems that describing it as “shameless self-promotion” absolves one, though I doubt it. But that’s the line so I hereby use it, whatever purgatory consequences… My new collection, in draft form,...
View ArticleFree Will as Essentail to Human Nature
A number of theologians and philosophers make the claim, implicitly if not explicitly, that having free will is essential to human nature. This is, perhaps, a fairly natural claim, particularly if one...
View ArticleTheology of Free Will
The latest batch of notifications coming out of Mele’s Big Questions in Free Will grants includes the winners for the 2011-2012 theology of free will grants. And ll three of the winners are...
View ArticleDivine Freedom Writing Retreat
Through a generous grant from the Templeton Foundation, I’m pleased to announce a writing retreat and workshop that I’m hosting next spring on ‘Divine Freedom’. Details of the retreat can be found...
View ArticleThe Value Component of Plantinga’s Free Will Defense
A defense (in Plantinga’s sense) against the logical problem of evil requires two components: a metaphysical component, which claims that a certain scenario is logically possible, and a value...
View ArticleA Theistic Argument for Compatibilism
One often hears it asserted that most theists are metaphysical libertarians. This seems to be supported, at least in the case of theistic philosophers, by the PhilPapers survey where target faculty...
View ArticleOn Terrible Libertarian Worlds
Consider a morally perfect world, w, that includes only libertarian free agents. Everyone in w is acting morally, no one is acting immorally. Let S be the set of all agents in w, where S = {a0, a1, a2,...
View ArticleEvil and Compatibilism
There is widespread belief that compatibilism + theism cannot offer a credible solution to the logical problem of evil. Why does anyone believe that? I think they’re reasoning this way: if...
View ArticleA Theistic Dilemma
Here’s a dilemma that might be worrisome for theists. It’s, in any case, a worry for me. Consider, first, the thesis in (1). 1. Possibly, God actualizes a morally perfect possible world or a morally...
View ArticleFuture Contingents and the Grounding Objection to Molinism
In chapter 5 of Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (1998), Thomas Flint defends a response to the grounding objection which he attributes to Alfred Freddoso. According to the Flint-Freddoso line,...
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